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THE PLAIN FEEL DOCTRINE OF MINNESOTA V.
DICKERSON: CREATING AN ILLUSION
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, hous-
es, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.'
This amendment delineates the parameters by which the gov-
ernment, particularly the police, and the American people interact
with each other. Despite the fundamental importance of the Fourth
Amendment, it provides little guidance to police or the American
people. Indeed, it is "brief, vague, general and unilluminating."2
Due to this ambiguity, the Fourth Amendment has not enjoyed a
consistent application.'
In Katz v. United States,4 the Supreme Court announced the
principle that warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreason-
able except for "a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions." The Supreme Court, however, has since deviated
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 45 (1991) (providing a
general history of the Fourth Amendment).
3. See Lewis R. Katz, Automobile Searches and Diminished Expectations in the War-
rant Clause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 557, 561 (1982) (stating that the uncertainty sur-
rounding the Fourth Amendment is due to the Court's failure to adhere to the principles
announced in Katz v. United States that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable and
that exceptions to the warrant requirement are to be carefully drawn). See generally Silas
J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 257
(1984) (providing an overview of declining Fourth Amendment protections).
4. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
5. Id. at 357.
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from this principle announced in Katz and has, in fact, developed a
myriad of exceptions and special circumstances that excuse the
government from complying with the warrant requirement.
The Supreme Court's treatment of automobiles provides a per-
fect example of the erosion of the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement. The automobile exception permits an officer who has
probable cause that evidence of a crime will be found in a vehicle
to stop that vehicle. He or she may then conduct a warrantless
search of the entire vehicle and all containers within the vehicle
which may hold evidence being sought.6
Historically, warrantless automobile searches were condoned
because the mobility of vehicles would permit occupants to drive
away while police sought search warrants.7 In Carroll v. United
States, federal agents stopped a vehicle suspected of containing
bootleg alcohol.' Because the occupants of the vehicle were not
under arrest, the agents had the difficult choice of either proceed-
ing with a warrantless search or procuring a warrant.9 Obviously,
if the agents had chosen to secure a warrant, the occupants of the
vehicle would have driven away. Thus, it was logical to excuse the
agents from complying with the warrant requirement in this situa-
tion. Since Carroll, however, the Supreme Court has simply ig-
nored the question of whether there exists any exigency caused by
mobility." Instead, the Supreme Court has approved "warrantless
searches of vehicles ... in which the possibilities of [a] vehicle
being removed or evidence in it destroyed were remote, if not non-
existent.""
United States v. Ross 2 epitomized the complete lack of Fourth
Amendment protection for automobiles. In Ross, the Supreme Court
noted that the warrantless search of an automobile in prior cases
was not predicated upon a showing of exigent circumstances.
6. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823-24 (1982) (stating that the scope of
a warrantless search is the same as the scope of a search authorized by a warrant).
7. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 150-53 (1925).
8. Id. at 134.
9. See id. at 135-36 (observing that after following for some time, the police eventu-
ally stopped and searched the vehicle).
10. See United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 487-88 (1985) (upholding a delayed
search of a vehicle that was seized and actually stored by police for three days).
11. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973).
12. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
13. Id. at 807 n.9 (noting the general rule that "if an individual gives the police prob-
able cause to believe a vehicle is transporting contraband, he loses the right to proceed
on his way without official interference."). Indeed, when the officers searched the vehicle,
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Thus, neither the impracticability of securing a warrant nor the exi-
gency caused by a vehicle's mobility need be demonstrated. 4 All
that must be shown is that the search was of an automobile. 5 The
automobile exception is simply one example of how the Fourth
Amendment has enjoyed reduced protection in recent years.'6
In Minnesota v. Dickerson,7 the Fourth Amendment was once
again at issue. In Dickerson, the Supreme Court faced the issue of
whether the police, pursuant to the plain feel exception, may seize
nonthreatening contraband from the defendant's body during a pat-
down search for weapons.'8 Unlike previous decisions, which have
systematically chipped away at the Fourth Amendment, 9 the
Dickerson ruling will prove to be a sensible decision that will not
further erode the Fourth Amendment.
Section II of this Note provides a general history of the Fourth
Amendment. Section II also focuses on two exceptions to the war-
rant requirement, the plain view doctrine' and the Terry stop-and-
frisk doctrine,2' which were pertinent to the Dickerson decision.
Ross had already been arrested. Id. at 801. Therefore, unlike the situation in Carroll,
there was no chance that the car containing the contraband could have been driven away.
14. Id. at 807 n.9.
15. Id.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 33-40 (discussing other Fourth Amendment
exceptions).
17. 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
18. Id. at 2134. For a further discussion of the inconsistent treatment of this issue, see
infra note 93.
19. Some of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment include: United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798, 806 (1982) (justifying the automobile exception to the warrant requirement
because of the "impracticability" of securing a warrant); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S.
454, 460 (1981) (upholding a search of the interior compartment of the arrestee's vehicle
even though the interior was not within the arrestee's reaching and grabbing distance);
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (recognizing the state's power to stop
vehicles for license and safety checks even without particularized suspicion); Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464 (1971) (observing objects in "plain view" allows
them to be seized); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (justifying the
warrantless search of a home where threatening objects and destructible evidence were
within the arrestee's reaching and grabbing distance); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27
(1968) (upholding police intrusion on less than probable cause); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (upholding warrantless entry into a house where police were in hot
pursuit of a suspected armed robber).
20. The plain view doctrine provides that the police may seize an object without a
warrant as long as (1) the police are in a lawful position to view the object and (2) the
object's incriminating nature is immediately apparent. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S.
128, 134-42 (1990) (eliminating the inadvertency requirement); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.
730, 740-43 (1983) (describing the immediately apparent requirement); Coolidge, 403 U.S.
at 464-71 (creating the plain view exception along with its limitations). For a more de-
tailed discussion about the plain view doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 41-52.
21. The Terry stop-and-frisk doctrine was established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
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Section III concentrates on the plain feel doctrine as it was applied
in Dickerson. Section IV introduces evidence supporting the thesis
that plain feel is not a further erosion of the Fourth Amendment.
This evidence will pertain to the reliability of the sense of touch,
the possibility of immediately recognizing an object as contraband,
the possibility of perjury in plain feel cases, and the possibility of
using Terry as a pretext to conduct broad evidentiary searches.
Section V introduces certain considerations, which, if not accounted
for, will permit subsequent courts to actually use Dickerson as a
tool to frustrate the Fourth Amendment. Section VI concludes that,
all factors remaining constant, the plain feel doctrine will not fur-
ther erode the Fourth Amendment and will prove to be a mere rec-
ognition that officers may use the sense of touch while carrying
out their duties.
II. THE FouRTH AMENDMENT
A. The General Rule
The Fourth Amendment is made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment because the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures is viewed as fundamental to the
concept of American jurisprudence.' The primary goal of the
framers in enacting the Fourth Amendment was to prevent the use
of general warrants which had given the government unchecked
authority to search people's homes and property.2'
Though the Fourth Amendment seeks to limit the scope of the
government's intrusions, the government is not without power. In-
deed, one cannot categorically claim the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. Instead, as the Supreme Court established in Katz v.
(1968). The Terry stop-and-frisk doctrine provides that an officer who has a reasonable
suspicion that a crime has been, will be, or is in the process of being committed may
stop an individual. Id. at 38. If, after this stop, the officer has a reasonable fear for his
safety or others nearby, he may pat down, or frisk, that individual for weapons. Id. at 29-
30. For a more detailed discussion about the Terry stop-and-frisk doctrine, see infra text
accompanying notes 54-67.
22. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) overruled on other grounds by Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) ("The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by
the police . . . is . . . implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause.").
23. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 46 (discussing the historical purposes of
the Fourth Amendment). The Fourth Amendment is supposed to impose substantive limits
on the scope of police conduct. Id.
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United States,24 one must have a subjective expectation of privacy
that is recognized as reasonable and legitimate by society in gener-
al in order to assert a Fourth Amendment privacy interest.' As a
result of this Katz privacy test, there are many police activities
which do not meet its threshold definition and, as such, do not
constitute an invasion of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.26
Thus, those police activities which fail to meet the Katz privacy
formula are not subject to any Fourth Amendment restrictions.
Assuming that a challenged police activity does infringe on a
protected privacy interest, the Fourth Amendment's two distinct
requirements then become applicable.27 First, a search or seizure
must be supported by probable cause.s Second, a search or sei-
zure must be authorized by a neutral and independent magistrate.29
It must be stressed that probable cause alone is never sufficient to
support a warrantless search or seizure. Probable cause is not an
exception to the warrant requirement."
As a general rule, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth
Amendment to mean that "searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable."3' Despite this seemingly straightforward mandate, a
24. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
25. Id. at 352 (holding that without a warrant electronic eavesdropping on a conversa-
tion over a public telephone violates the Fourth Amendment). Katz did not discuss which
party had the burden of proof in this type of situation. However, in Florida v. Riley, 488
U.S. 445, 455 (1989) (O'Conner, J., concurring), Justice O'Connor expressly stated that
the burden is on the person claiming the Fourth Amendment violation.
26. Riley, 488 U.S. at 451-52 (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial
surveillance of partially covered greenhouse); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37
(1988) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the trash that is left outside for
the garbage collectors); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (finding no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in open fields); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707
(1983) (finding no expectation of privacy to restrict dog sniffing luggage at airport); Unit-
ed States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282-85 (1983) (finding the use of a beeper attached to
the bumper of a vehicle to help track defendant's route did not constitute a search);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (finding that there is no expectation of
privacy in telephone numbers dialed). Of course, if the challenged activity is undertaken
by a private person the Fourth Amendment is simply inapplicable. See LEwis R. KATZ &
JAY SHAPIRO, NEw YORK SUPPRESSION MANUAL 5-2 (1994) (comparing arrest, search,
and seizure requirements of federal and New York state law).
27. KArZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 5-2.
28. See id. at 5-2; see also Lewis R. Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed:
The Rise of a Public Place Exemption to the Warrant Requirement, 36 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 375, 383-97 (1986) (analyzing the automobile exception to the warrant requirement
and explaining that the Fourth Amendment has enjoyed less protection).
29. Katz, supra note 28, at 383.
30. KATZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 5-3.
31. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (holding that electronic eavesdrop-
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great majority of government intrusions are actually made without
warrants. 32
B. The Exceptions
Historically, warrantless intrusions were justified by exigent
circumstances." The police were allowed to bypass prior judicial
approval, assuming they had probable cause, on the grounds that
the delay in obtaining a warrant would (1) endanger their safety or
that of others, or (2) result in the destruction of evidence.14 Un-
less such an exigency existed, the police were required to obtain a
warrant.35 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has deviated from the
historical use of exigent circumstances and has accepted a balanc-
ing test.
This balancing test weighs the interests of the people in being
free from unreasonable searches and seizures against the interests
of the police in being able to effectively carry out their duties.36
The Supreme Court has used this balancing test to carve out ex-
ceptions to the Fourth Amendment requirements. For example, pas-
sengers travelling into America across the borders are subject to
warrantless searches and seizures.37 Although the passenger has, of
course, a legitimate interest in being left alone, border searches are
exempted from the warrant requirement.38 The interest of the pas-
senger in being left alone is outweighed by the government's inter-
est in protecting its borders.39 Thus, the warrant requirement is
seen as placing too great of a burden on custom officials in carry-
ing out their duties.' Two further exceptions, which are pertinent
ping of conversation over public telephone without a warrant violates the Fourth Amend-
ment).
32. See supra note 19 (providing examples of permissible government intrusions with-
out a warrant).
33. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 125.
34. Id. at 125.
35. Recall, probable cause alone is never sufficient for a warrantless intrusion. There is
no such thing as a probable cause exception to the warrant requirement. See supra note
30 and accompanying text.
36. See Katz, supra note 28, at 378 (discussing the conflict between Fourth Amend-
ment privacy interest and the goal of law enforcement).
37. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (stating that border searches
are considered reasonable because of "the single fact that the person or item in question
[has] entered into our country from outside").
38. Id. at 621.
39. id. at 619.
40. Id. at 621; see also supra note 19 (providing a list of exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment to allow officials to carry out their duties).
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to the Dickerson case and are also based on such balancing, are
the plain view doctrine and the Terry stop-and-frisk doctrine.
1. The Plain View Exception
The plain view exception allows an officer to seize an object
without a warrant as long as (1) the officer is in a lawful position
to view the object,4' and (2) the object's incriminating nature is
immediately apparent.42 The lawful position requirement may be
satisfied when an officer's presence is authorized by (1) a search
warrant,43 (2) an in-home arrest pursuant to an arrest warrant,"
or (3) one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. If there
is no intrusion upon a justifiable expectation of privacy, the plain
view doctrine, like the entire Fourth Amendment, is simply not at
41. The lawful position requirement needs to be satisfied at the time of both the initial
intrusion and the subsequent seizure. KATZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 15-5. For ex-
ample, if an officer sees marijuana plants from the street, he may not enter the premises
to seize the plants without a warrant. Surely, his observation established probable cause.
However, probable cause is not an exception to the warrant requirement. See supra note
30 and accompanying text. Although the observation of the plants was lawful, it is not
enough to enter the premises to effect a seizure without a warrant or exigent circumstanc-
es. KATZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 15-5 (discussing the warrant requirement in the
context of this marijuana hypothetical).
42. See supra note 20. Originally, the Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971), required three criteria for the plain view doctrine to be applicable.
These were: 1) the police had to be in a lawful position when observing the object, 2)
the object's incriminating nature had to be immediately apparent, and 3) the discovery of
the object had to be inadvertent. Id. at 466. The goal of the inadvertency requirement is
to make police officers specify in their affidavits the objects that are sought to be
searched and seized. Id. at 469-71. With inadvertency, it will prevent the police from
entering a location and engaging in widespread general searches until something incrimi-
nating is found. Id. The inadvertency requirement has since been eliminated. Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990). The Horton court argued that the inadvertency
requirement was not necessary to prevent general searches. Id. at 139. Instead, the Court
reasoned that the interest against general searches was already protected by the Fourth
Amendment itself which prohibits the issuance of a warrant that does not particularly
describe the place to be searched. Id. at 140. The Court also expressed great faith in
police officers' integrity, commenting that "we see no reason why [the police] would
deliberately omit a particular description of the item to be seized from the application for
a search warrant." Id. at 138. Police integrity, however, should not be viewed as a con-
stant. See infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
43. For example, when police officers have a warrant to search for specific objects but
discover evidence or other contraband not mentioned in the warrant, no new warrant is
needed and the police may seize those items. KATZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 15-6.
However, once officers find the objects that the search warrant specifically described, the
search is over and the plain view exception terminates. Officers cannot continue to look
around for contraband. Id. at 15-7.
44. Id. at 15-6.
45. Horton, 496 U.S. at 135.
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issue.'
The immediately apparent requirement is satisfied if the officer
has probable cause to seize the article seen in plain view.47 The
rationale for requiring the incriminating nature to be immediately
apparent is that warrantless searches are to be discouraged or, at
least, closely monitored.' If the incriminating nature of an object
is not immediately apparent, the police would have to further probe
the object to determine its nature. Such a further probing, no mat-
ter how slight, would constitute a search, and would need to be
supported by independent probable cause.49 Without this require-
ment, the police could enter a residence and engage in a fishing
expedition, turning over and manipulating objects, until something
of incriminating nature was discovered." Such a general search
was one of the primary evils the Fourth Amendment sought to
eliminate.5
Even if officers are lawfully present and have immediately
recognized an object as contraband, they may only seize that
item. 2 It must be stressed that plain view does not permit the
authorities to search the item. 3 Once the object is seized, there
can be no further concern that the evidence will be destroyed.
Therefore, there is no further need to excuse the warrant require-
ment before a full-blown search is conducted.
46. For example, if an individual is on a street comer holding a bag of cocaine out in
the open, visible to any passerby, the plain view analysis is inapplicable. The individual
has no justifiable expectation of privacy under Katz, and there is no need to justify the
police observations of that bag. Compare this situation with the following. Suppose a
police officer, standing on a street comer observes marijuana plants sitting in a window
sill. Although the officer's observation would be lawful, he could not enter the house to
seize the plants without a warrant or exigent circumstances. Otherwise, his intrusion would
be unlawful. Id. at 15-5.
47. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (noting that evidence
which is immediately apparent may be seized without a warrant under the plain view doc-
trine).
48. See id. (asserting that the plain view requirement is designed to prevent warrantless
searches where they are not imperative).
49. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987) (holding that the movement of
a stereo even a few inches to obtain its serial number constituted an invalid search be-
cause the serial number was not in plain view and, as such, the incriminating nature of
the stereo was not immediately apparent).
50. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466.
51. See supra text accompanying note 21.
52. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738-39 (1983) (stating that once an object is
seen in plain view, the owner loses privacy interest but retains possessory and ownership
interests).
53. See KATZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 15-27.
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2. The Terry Stop-and-Frisk Doctrine
The second exception to the warrant requirement that is perti-
nent to Dickerson is the Terry stop-and-frisk doctrine. In Terry v.
Ohio, 4 a Cleveland plain clothes detective became suspicious of
three men whom he thought were "casing" a storefront5 The of-
ficer confronted the three men, identified himself, and asked the
suspects for their names. 6 The men replied incoherently. 7 The
officer spun Terry around and patted his breast pocket.5 8 During
this pat-down, the officer felt a pistol which he removed. 9
The issues in Terry were whether the Fourth Amendment per-
mitted (1) the initial stop and (2) the subsequent frisk.' The Su-
preme Court upheld the stop, holding that an officer may stop an
individual if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the individ-
ual is engaged in criminal activity." This reasonable suspicion
requirement is a lower standard than probable cause, but the court
recognized that some lesser intrusions were needed to allow the
police to effectively carry out their work. 2 Indeed, "[i]t would
have been poor police work ... to have failed to investigate this
behavior further."' 3
The second aspect of Terry involved the actual touching, the
frisk, of the defendant after he was stopped. The frisk is not an
automatic byproduct of the stop. Only if the officer has a reason-
able fear for his safety or the safety of others nearby may he con-
duct a pat-down search for weapons.'M If the frisk reveals an ob-
ject that feels like a weapon, the officer can then retrieve the ob-
ject.' If the object retrieved is not a weapon, but some other con-
traband, the seizure of the object would still be lawful if a reason-
able officer would have believed that the object was a weapon
54. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
55. Id. at 6.
56. Id. at 6-7.
57. Id. at 7.
58. Id.
59. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 7 (1968).
60. Id. at 12.
61. Id. at 30.
62. Id. at 20 (stating that since the police activity involved "swift action" based upon
"on-the-spot" observations, the challenged activity would not be tested against the warrant
requirement but against the general prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures).
63. Id. at 23.
64. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
65. Id. at 30.
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when it was first touched.' The purpose of the frisk is only to
discover possible threatening objects.67 Thus, a Terry stop-and-
frisk is not a traditional search and seizure because it relies on
reasonable suspicion and reasonable fear rather than probable cause.
C. The Remedy
If a challenged police activity does encroach on a privacy
interest, as defined in Katz v. United States,6 and does not fall
under one of the enumerated exceptions, the search or seizure is
illegal and any evidence seized will be excluded pursuant to the
exclusionary rule.69 The exclusionary rule provides that evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment may not be used in a
trial and must be suppressed.
66. See People v. Perry, 133 A.D.2d 380, 382 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (holding an ar-
rest lawful where an officer removed what he thought to be a weapon and discovered it
was jewelry), affd, 71 N.Y.2d 871 (1988). This scenario is different from Dickerson be-
cause when the officer in Dickerson first touched the object, he knew it was not a weap-
on. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2138-39 (1993).
67. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
68. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
69. See generally KATZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 5-2 (discussing the history,
application, limitations, and exceptions of the exclusionary rule).
70. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949), overruled on other grounds
by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Wolf, however, did not make this rule applicable
to the states. Id. at 33. Instead, it was not until Mapp that the exclusionary rule was
made applicable to the states. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655. It should be noted that the
exclusionary rule has often come under fire. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 241-46 (pro-
viding an overview of criticisms of the exclusionary rule). It has been criticized as only
protecting the guilty. Id. at 244. Arguably, this criticism helped ignite the incentive for
the court to adopt the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913, 926 (1984) (concluding that the cost of suppressing evidence
seized in good faith outweighs the benefits). The good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule allows the use of illegally obtained evidence if it was obtained pursuant to a search
warrant upon which the police reasonably relied in good faith, but which is also later
deemed invalid. The exclusionary rule has generated massive debate. See generally Craig
M. Bradley, The "Good Faith Exception" Cases: Reasonable Exercises in Futility, 60 IND.
L.J. 287 (1985) (discussing whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule is
an effective way of dealing with Fourth Amendment problems); Gary S. Goodpaster, An
Essay on Ending the Exclusionary Rule, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1065 (1982) (reassessing the
benefits of the exclusionary rule and suggesting a good faith exception as a possible
alternative); William J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365
(1981) (arguing that a good faith exception would have a devastating effect on the Fourth
Amendment); Malcolm R. Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?
62 JUDICATURE 214 (1978) (discussing the enormous societal cost of the exclusionary rule
and positing possible alternatives).
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III. MINNESOTA V. DICKERSON
A. The Facts and Procedural History
On November 9, 1989, two Minneapolis police officers were
on patrol in their squad car when they observed Dickerson leaving
a notorious crack house.7! ' Dickerson began walking in the direc-
tion of the police car;, however, once he spotted the car and made
eye contact with one of the officers, he abruptly halted and began
walking in the opposite direction into an alley on the other side of
the crack house.'
The officers followed Dickerson into the alley with their car
and ordered him to stop and to submit to a pat-down search.73
Although no weapons were revealed during this search, the officer
felt a small lump in Dickerson's jacket.74 The officer testified "[I]
felt a lump, a small lump, in the front pocket. I examined it with
my fingers and it slid and it felt to be a lump of crack cocaine in
cellophane."75 After this search, the officer reached into the jacket
pocket and retrieved a small plastic bag which contained crack
cocaine."
The trial court found that the officers were justified in perform-
ing both the stop and frisk of Dickerson.' The trial court then
analogized the officer's "plain feel" to the plain view doctrine and
concluded that the officer's sense of touch provided the probable
cause necessary to seize the cocaine.78 According to the trial
court, there was "no distinction as to which sensory perception the
officer use[d] to conclude that the material [was] contraband."79
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, reversed." The
court of appeals upheld the trial court's determination that the offi-
cers were justified in stopping and frisking the defendant."' How-
71. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2133 (1993).
72. 1&
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2133-34 (1993).
77. Id. at 2134.
78. Il
79. aL
80. State v. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d 462 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), affd, 481 N.W.2d
840 (Minn. 1992), aff'd sub nom. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
81. Id at 465.
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ever, the court concluded that the officer overstepped the bounds of
Terry." According to the court, the scope of a Terry frisk is
strictly limited to a search for weapons.8 3 Since the officer testi-
fied that he knew the object he touched was not a weapon, the
court concluded that the officer overstepped the bounds marked by
Terry by reaching for the non-weapon.84 In so holding, the court
rejected the plain feel exception, reasoning that the only purpose
for a pat-down search is to uncover weapons and not "soft objects"
like drugs. 5
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed. 6 Again, the stop and
frisk were both deemed to be valid under Terry.7 However, the
Minnesota Supreme Court echoed the court of appeals decision in
holding that the officer exceeded the permissible scope of intrusion
allowed by Terry."8 The court concluded that once it was obvious
that Dickerson did not have a weapon, the officer was further
precluded from reaching into the defendant's pocket. 9 Any further
intrusion required a warrant or probable cause to arrest and since
the officer had neither, the search of defendant's pocket was unjus-
tified.' The court rejected the trial court's reasoning and conclud-
ed that the sense of touch was not capable of providing probable
cause for arrest.9' The court's disapproval of plain feel was clear:
The officer's 'immediate' perception is especially remark-
able because this lump weighed 0.2 grams and was no big-
ger than a marble. We are led to surmise that the officer's
sense of touch must compare with that of the fabled prin-
cess who couldn't sleep when a pea was hidden beneath
her pile of mattresses. But a close examination of the re-
cord reveals that like the precocious princess, the officer's
82. Id. at 465-66.
83. Id. at 466.
84. Id. at 465-66.
85. State v. Dickerson, 469 N.W.2d 462, 466 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), affid, 481
N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 1992), affd sub nom. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130
(1993).
86. State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 1992), affd sub nom. Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
87. Id. at 844.
88. Id. at 843-44.
89. Id. at 846.
90. Id.
91. State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1992), affd sub nom. Minnesota
v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
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'immediate' discovery in this case is fiction, not fact.'
The Supreme Court of the United States decided to grant certiorari
to resolve the conflict among the state and federal courts over this
issue.93
B. The Plain Feel Doctrine
The plain feel doctrine allows the police to use their sense of
touch in carrying out their duties. It must be stressed that plain
feel is not a separate exception to the Fourth Amendment, but
rather only becomes applicable in the context of plain view. Thus,
in upholding the plain feel doctrine, the Supreme Court analogized
it to plain view,94 and determined the validity of the seizure of
the crack cocaine in Dickerson by analyzing whether the require-
ments of plain view were met. Specifically, (1) was the officer in a
lawful position to view the object, and (2) was the object's incrim-
inating nature was immediately apparent.95
The first issue to consider is whether the officer in Dickerson
was in a lawful position when he placed his hands on Dickerson's
outer clothing. This requires the application of the principles an-
nounced in Terry v. Ohio. 6 Since Dickerson was leaving a notori-
ous crack house and behaved nervously when he spotted the po-
lice,' a reasonable police officer would have believed that
Dickerson was involved in criminal activity. Therefore, the police
92. Id. at 844.
93. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 53 (1992). Various state and federal courts
have faced this issue. For states accepting plain feel, see People v. Chavers, 658 P.2d 96
(Cal. 1983); State v. Guy, 492 N.W.2d 311, 317 (Wis. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
3020 (1993). For states rejecting plain feel, see State v. Collins, 679 P.2d 80, 82 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1983); People v. McCarty, 296 N.E.2d 862, 863 (111. App. Ct. 1973); State v.
Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1992), affd, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993); People v.
Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298, 300 (N.Y. 1993); State v. Rhodes, 788 P.2d 1380, 1381 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1990); Commonwealth v. Marconi, 597 A.2d 616, 619 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991);
State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96, 101 (Wash. 1982). For federal circuits accepting the
plain feel doctrine before Minnesota v. Dickerson was handed down, see United States v.
Coleman, 969 F.2d 126, 132 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Salazar, 945 F.2d 47, 51
(2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1975 (1992); United States v. Buchannon, 878
F.2d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Norman, 701 F.2d 295, 297 (4th Cir.
1983); United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1043 (1981).
94. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1993).
95. See supra note 20.
96. For a complete explanation of Terry, see supra text accompanying notes 54-67.
97. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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were justified in stopping Dickerson." Given the nature of the
drug business and the propensity of drug dealers to carry weap-
ons,99 the police were further justified in being concerned with
their safety. Thus, the officer was justified in conducting a pat-
down search for weapons."° Since the requirements of Terry
were satisfied, the officer's hands were in a lawful position when
he touched the nonthreatening contraband.' ' Thus, the first re-
quirement of plain view was satisfied. Indeed, the issue of whether
or not Terry was applicable to Dickerson was not a critical issue in
the case, as defense counsel did not even challenge the officer's
stop and frisk of Dickerson.l" The critical issue was whether or
not an officer could immediately recognize an object's criminality
through his sense of touch. 3
In a technical sense, the object's incriminating nature could not
have been immediately apparent given that the officer did not see
the object.' However, for the incriminating nature of an object
to be immediately apparent, it has never been required that an
object has to be seen by the eyes.0 5 The Court's view that an
object's incriminating nature can be immediately apparent through
the sense of touch is consistent with the view that "[e]vidence in
plain view is not restricted to items which can only be seen, but
rather includes the realization of items or events to all of the hu-
man senses, smell, sight, touch, hearing and taste."'" Thus, as-
98. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2134 (referring to the trial court's findings).
99. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968) (noting that "American criminals have a
long tradition of armed violence"); United States v. Salazar, 945 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir.
1991) (commenting that officers know that narcotics dealers frequently carry weapons);
United States v. Crespo, 834 F.2d 267, 271 (2nd Cir. 1987) (commenting that to dealers
in narcotics, firearms are the tools of the trade); United States v. Wiener, 534 F.2d 15,
18 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting that dealers in narcotics keep firearms almost to the same ex-
tent they keep scales, baggies, and cutting equipment), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 820 (1976);
State v. Guy, 492 N.W.2d 311, 314 (Wis. 1992) (stating the belief that weapons are tools
of the drug trade), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3020 (1993).
100. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2134 (referring to the trial court's findings).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2138.
103. See id. at 2136-37 (noting that police may seize an object if its incriminating
character is immediately apparent through touch).
104. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298, 302 (N.Y. 1993) ("[T]he identity and
nature of the concealed item cannot be confirmed until seen .... ").
105. See United States v. Sifuentes, 504 F.2d 845, 848 (4th Cir. 1974) (noting that the
overwhelming odor of marijuana placed the contraband in "plain view"); see infra text
accompanying notes 119-23.
106. State v. Washington, 396 N.W.2d 156, 161-62 (Wis. 1986).
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suming the validity of the Supreme Court's argument that the sense
of touch is reliable, the second prong of plain view was satisfied
and the seizure of the object was justified.
However, since the officer had testified that he had to squeeze,
slide, and manipulate the object, the officer could not have imme-
diately recognized the object as contraband. 7 As a result, his ac-
tions amounted to a general evidentiary search which Terry does
not allow. ' Although Terry permitted the officer to place his
hands on Dickerson's outer clothing and feel the lump in
Dickerson's jacket, nothing justified his further manipulation of the
object after assuring himself that the object was not a weapon. 9
Thus, because the officer failed to immediately identify the object
as contraband the instant he touched it, he was not entitled to
further probe Dickerson's jacket."' Therefore, the seizure of co-
caine was unlawful."'
The limited nature of the plain feel doctrine must be stressed.
Its scope is limited to what the police may do pursuant to the
underlying lawful intrusion. Thus, in the Terry context, plain feel
must first be preceded by a lawful stop and a lawful frisk. If those
elements are not satisfied, the plain feel doctrine does not come
into play. Although the plain feel doctrine allows an officer to
seize nonthreatening contraband which is immediately recognized,
the purpose of the search remains the uncovering of weapons. Plain
feel does not authorize a search for drugs." 2 Instead, it remains a
search for weapons during which the officer fortuitously comes
upon and recognizes contraband.
107. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2138-39 (1993) (concluding that
since the incriminating character of the lump under defendant's jacket was not immediate-
ly apparent the search was invalid under Terry).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2138 (1993). The Court stated, "[h]ere,
the officer's continued exploration of respondent's pocket after having concluded that it
contained no weapon was unrelated to '[t]he sole justification of the search [under Ter-
ry:]. ... the protection of the police officer and others nearby."' Id. at 2138-39 (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 29 (1968) (alteration in original)).
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IV. THE WELL-CRAFrED RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT
IN MINNESOTA V. DICKERSON
The plain feel exception is a misnomer. Superficially, it appears
to be an example of declining Fourth Amendment protections."'
However, the plain feel exception is no exception at all; it is mere-
ly a sensible application of the plain view doctrine to the sense of
touch.
Upon close examination of the Supreme Court's ruling, it be-
comes apparent that what has been created is an illusion. First, the
Supreme Court did not categorically accept that in all cases the
sense of touch is inherently reliable. Instead, the Court made it
clear that the sense of touch is capable of determining the identity
of an object."4 Second, even though the Court accepted the no-
tion that the sense of touch may be used to identify contraband,
the Justices severly limited its use by requiring immediate recogni-
tion."5 Third, the possibility of reenacting the frisk and the op-
portunity for the court to actually feel the object presents a unique
opportunity for a court to review whether the seizure was valid and
whether an officer's possible testimony that he immediately recog-
nized the object as contraband was credible. 6 Fourth, the plain
feel doctrine will not lead to the use of Terry as a pretext to con-
113. One of the criticisms of plain feel is that it will lead to complete evidentiary body
searches. See infra text accompanying notes 170-75. However, this Note will not discuss
whether the plain feel doctrine is constitutional or unconstitutional. There are numerous
articles and cases supporting both views. See generally David L. Haselkorn, The Case
Against a Plain Feel Exception to the Warrant Requirement, 54 U. Cm5. L. REV. 683
(1987) (arguing that the plain feel doctrine exceeds the bounds of Fourth Amendment
exceptions); Larry E. Holtz, The "Plain Touch" Corollary: A Natural and Foreseeable
Consequence of the Plain Feel Doctrine, 95 DICK. L. REv. 521 (1991) (contending that
the plain feel doctrine is not only appropriate but is also a necessary corollary to the
plain view exception); Katherine W. Iverson, "Plain Feel": A Common Sense Proposal
Following State v. Dickerson, 16 HAMLINE L. REv. 247 (1992) (concluding that the plain
feel doctrine does not exceed Fourth Amendment constitutional privileges); Kevin A.
Lantz, Search and Seizure: "The Princess and the 'Rock"': Minnesota Declines to Extend
"Plain View" to "Plain Feel," 18 U. DAYTON L. REv. 539 (1993) (contending that plain
feel is not analogous to plain view based on lack of immediacy and reliability of touch,
and the intrusiveness of tactile manipulation). This Note does not attempt to revisit these
arguments but, rather, attempts to predict the likely consequences of the doctrine as estab-
lished by the Supreme Court. However, where necessary, certain pros and cons of the
plain feel doctrine are discussed to provide the reader with necessary background informa-
tion.
114. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
115. Id.
116. See infra text accompanying notes 147-69.
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duct broad evidentiary searches." 7
A. The Reliability of the Sense of Touch
In recognizing the plain feel doctrine, the Dickerson Court
analogized plain feel to plain view."' This comparison to the
sense of sight is not new. For instance, previous cases have recog-
nized other doctrines such as plain smell"9 and plain hearing."m
The plain view doctrine should not be interpreted to mean only
that the sense of sight may be used in seizing evidence, rather,
plain view should be interpreted to mean that an object is "obvious
to the senses."'' Indeed, "[e]vidence in plain view is not restrict-
ed to items which can only be seen, but rather includes the realiza-
tion of items or events to all of the human senses, smell, sight,
touch, hearing and taste."' 2 Thus, in recognizing the sense of
touch as reliable, the Supreme Court had no other choice but to
analogize to the plain view doctrine. It would seem illogical to
recognize the other human senses but refuse to recognize the sense
of touch. Indeed, the Terry doctrine itself recognizes that the offi-
cer will use the sense of touch in determining whether an object is
a weapon."m Nevertheless, courts have continued to reject the
plain feel doctrine as inconsistent with the plain view doctrine by
reasoning that the sense of touch is inherently unreliable.'24
117. See infra text accompanying notes 170-76.
118. See Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
119. See, e.g., United States v. Lueck, 678 F.2d 895, 903 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting that
the odor of marijuana was one of several factors considered in determining whether prob-
able cause existed); United States v. Rivera, 595 F.2d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding
that the odor of marijuana established probable cause for a search); United States v.
Sifuentes, 504 F.2d 845, 848 (4th Cir. 1974) (smelling strong odor of marijuana made the
presence of marijuana obvious to the senses).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 543 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that
what an officer overhears with his naked ear is per se lawful if he is in a lawful posi-
tion); United States v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046, 1051-52 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment was not violated where motel room conversations were overheard by
the unaided ears of police in an adjoining room), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979).
121. Sifuentes, 504 F.2d at 848.
122. State v. Washington, 396 N.W.2d 156, 161-62 (Wis. 1986).
123. As the Supreme Court stated, "[tihe very premise of Terry, after all, is that offi-
cers will be able to detect the presence of weapons through the sense of touch." Minne-
sota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1993).
124. See People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298, 302 (N.Y. 1993) (noting that identification
via touching an object is inherently less reliable than seeing an object); State v. Broadnax,
654 P.2d 96, 102 (Wash. 1982) (reasoning that the "tactile sense does not usually result
in immediate knowledge of the nature of an item"). Also recall that the Minnesota Su-
preme Court rejected an analogy to plain view on the grounds that "the sense of touch is
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This dispute over the reliability of the sense of touch is mis-
placed. Both cases which support plain feel and those which do
not miss the mark. The problem with a categorical characterization
of the sense of touch as inherently less reliable or inherently reli-
able is that it rests on pure assumptions. Not once do the respec-
tive courts support their conclusions with any factual data regarding
the reliability of the sense of touch." Furthermore, one must
question the conspicuous absence of a concern about the reliability
of other senses. Indeed, what makes one sense more reliable than
the other? For instance, it is possible that one police officer is
unable to smell very well while another officer may have poor
hearing. It is also possible that an officer with twenty-five years of
experience can identify an object through his sense of touch better
than a rookie police officer with little or no experience.
Even though the Court made it clear that the sense of touch
may be used to determine an object's criminality," it did not es-
tablish a per se rule that in every situation the sense of touch will
be reliable. Indeed, the Court stated that "[e]ven if it were true that
the sense of touch is . . . less reliable . . . that only suggests that
officers will less often be able to justify [the] seizures of...
contraband."' 27
inherently less immediate and less reliable than the sense of sight." State v. Dickerson,
481 N.W.2d 840, 845 (Minn. 1992), affd, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993). It is noteworthy that
some courts have refused to recognize the sense of touch on the grounds that "touching"
is inherently more intrusive than other senses like sight and smell. For example, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court stated that "the sense of touch is far more intrusive into the per-
sonal privacy that is at the core of the Fourth Amendment. It is one thing to see a bag
of marijuana in a suspect's pocket . . . [i]t is quite something else to pinch, squeeze, and
rub the suspect's pocket .... .. Id. In Broadnax, the court rejected the sense of touch,
in part, because the officer's touching '"lacked the distinctive character of the smell of
marijuana."' 654 P.2d at 102 (quoting State v. Broadnax, 612 P.2d 391, 399 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1980) (Ringold, J., dissenting)). The Broadnax court further stated, "[w]hereas the
detection of evidence by sight or smell can be accomplished without the physical intru-
sion of one's person, this is not so with respect to evidence discovered by touch." Id.
This intrusiveness concern was accounted for in Dickerson. By requiring an officer to
immediately recognize an object as contraband and prohibiting any further manipulation,
squeezing, or sliding of the object, the Supreme Court has assured that the "touching" in
a plain feel situation will not be any broader or any more intrusive than that already per-
mitted by Terry.
125. See supra note 124 (illustrating that none of the cases cited make mention of any
statistical data supporting their conclusion).
126. The Supreme Court stated that "the sense of touch is capable of revealing the
nature of an object." Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.
127. Id.
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B. Limiting Plain Feel by Requiring Immediate Recognition
In accepting the plain feel doctrine, the Supreme Court did not
give an irrevocable license to the police to use their sense of
touch. The Court's rationale only established that the sense of
touch may be able to justify a seizure." The Supreme Court
may have approved of plain feel and the sense of touch merely to
put an end to arbitrary generalizations lacking any factual support
which had been pervasive in previous plain feel cases.'29 Howev-
er, in recognizing the validity of the sense of touch and plain feel,
the Supreme Court limited its use by prohibiting any further ma-
nipulation, squeezing, or sliding of the object.'3° Thus, plain feel
should not be viewed as an endorsement for all-out evidentiary
searches.
The Supreme Court ruled that an officer may seize nonthreat-
ening contraband during a Terry frisk only if at that immediate
touch, that instant pat-down, the incriminating nature of the object
is plainly obvious.' This will be difficult to do. Indeed, "[t]he
tactile sense does not usually result in the immediate knowledge of
the nature of the item."' For example, in Dickerson itself, the
officer testified that he had to squeeze the object before determin-
ing the object's criminality.' Justice Scalia also questioned how
an officer would be able to determine whether a small object in a
128. This is consistent with general Fourth Amendment principles that the determination
of Fourth Amendment issues should be fact-specific. United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 565 n.6 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that the drug courier profile
does not necessarily establish reasonable suspicion and "[e]ach case raising a Fourth
Amendment issue must be judged on its own facts").
129. Mr. George E. Dix, who holds the A.W. Walker Centennial Chair in Law at the
University of Texas at Austin, states:
Some "plain feel" reports appear highly reliable. Some reports of "plain feel"
observations appear highly questionable. Generalizations are impossible. There is
no realistic choice but to rely on trial judges to make case-by-case judgments
regarding the credibility of officers' claims that their visual observations or
tactile sensations were reliable enough to trigger the probable cause necessary
for further action.
The Court undoubtedly granted review in Dickerson to disapprove the
arbitrary distinction drawn by the Minnesota Court.
George E. Dix, Court Should Place Limits on Pat-Down Searches, NJ. LJ., Feb. 1, 1993,
at 17, 19.
130. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2138-39.
131. Id. at 2138.
132. State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96, 102 (Wash. 1982).
133. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2133.
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jacket pocket was crack cocaine instead of a piece of chewing gum
or some other object.13 4 If this is the case, one can expect that
the plain view doctrine will be applicable only in very rare cases.
This limitation on the permitted scope of the search will prevent
the plain feel doctrine from eroding Fourth Amendment
protections.'
The Dickerson rule allows the police to carry out their duties
more effectively while adequately protecting Fourth Amendment
interests. There should be no reason why the police should be
required to obtain a search warrant if they immediately recognize
an object as contraband. It would be very likely that the evidence
would be destroyed. The sense of touch, however, does have its
limits and a seizure would be unlawful if the police must manipu-
late, squeeze or slide an object.'36 This immediate recognition re-
quirement ensures that the police may not conduct broad evidentia-
ry searches of bodies. Thus, as long as the strict limits of plain
feel are adhered to, the Fourth Amendment will not be further
eroded.
The theory that plain feel will not significantly erode the
Fourth Amendment can be proven by applying the plain feel doc-
trine, as established by Dickerson, to cases which have previously
rejected the doctrine on the grounds that plain feel excessively
intrudes into Fourth Amendment rights. The decisions that were
arrived at in these cases will remain the same given the prohibition
against squeezing, sliding, and manipulating.'37 In State v. Col-
lins,' the Arizona Court of Appeals held that assuming the offi-
cers were justified in stopping and frisking the suspect for weap-
ons, their invasion of the suspects' pockets after seizing "soft"
objects, which were not weapons, violated the Fourth
Amendment.'39 The officer in Collins testified that during his pat-
down of the defendant he did not discover any weapons but did
134. Justices Hear Arguments on Frisking For Drugs, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 4, 1993, at
20.
135. The Ohio Supreme Court recently stated, "[t]his limitation [in Dickerson] on the
'plain feel' exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment ensures that
police will search only within the narrow parameters allowed for a Terry-type search."
State v. Evans, 618 N.E.2d 162, 170 n.5 (Ohio 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1195
(1994).
136. See supra text accompanying note 107.
137. Id.
138. 679 P.2d 80 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
139. Id. at 82-83.
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discover something unusual in the defendant's pockets." When
questioned whether he had squeezed the object during his pat-
down, the officer replied "yes."'14' The Court of Appeals rejected
the State's contention that the object was properly seized pursuant
to the plain feel exception. 42
Applying the Dickerson rule to Collins, the same decision
would be warranted. The officer in Collins is similar to the officer
in Dickerson. Both officers failed to realize that the objects, at that
immediate touch, were contraband. Because the officer in Collins
admitted that he "squeezed" the object, he, like the officer in
Dickerson, admitted his inability to immediately recognize the
object as contraband. Thus, if the plain feel exception would have
been applied by the Arizona Court of Appeals, the same conclusion
in rejecting the evidence would have been reached.
In State v. Hobart,'43 the Washington Supreme Court held
that the officer's seizure of contraband during a pat-down frisk
went beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment.'" In Hobart,
the officer did not ascertain the criminal nature of the two spongy
objects until after "squeezing" them. 4 Again the facts of Hobart,
if applied to the plain feel theory as established by Dickerson,
would yield the same result: the suppression of the evidence and
the protection of Fourth Amendment rights. The officer in Hobart,
like the officer in Dickerson, exceeded the Fourth Amendment
because he did not recognize the object, at the first touch, as con-
traband. The violation was the continued feeling of the suspect's
pockets even after he assured himself that the object was not a
weapon.
If officers are attuned to the fact that they are not allowed to
further squeeze nonthreatening objects, and realize how difficult it
is to immediately recognize a small objects like drugs, they will
come to realize that the plain feel doctrine has not provided them
with a great weapon. There is, however, the possibility that police
officers will attempt to avoid the limited nature of plain feel by
simply testifying that they immediately recognized an object in a
suspects's clothing as drugs.'"
140. Id. at 82.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 81-82.
143. 617 P.2d 429 (Wash. 1980).
144. Id. at 433-34.
145. Id.
146. Ira Mickenberg, Crime Docket Was Quiet, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 23, 1993, at 6, 11.
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C. Perjury and the Plain Feel Doctrine
The fact that an officer may commit perjury so as to meet the
requirements of plain feel is not a phenomenon unique to the plain
feel doctrine. 47 Unscrupulous behavior on the part of the police
is not the result of the plain feel doctrine, and has, in fact, perme-
ated Fourth Amendment jurisprudence."4 Nevertheless, the effect
of possible perjury must be considered.
The propensity of an officer to perjure himself regarding the
recognition of an object actually may not be very high in the plain
feel context. The plain feel doctrine lends itself to ready analysis
For instance, in Ohio v. Payne, No. 13898, 1994 WL 171215, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
1994), appeal dismissed, 639 N.E.2d 114 (Ohio 1994), the officer patted down the defen-
dant because of a huge bulge in defendant's pocket. The officer testified, "I squeezed that
large bulge .... Right away I know [sic] it's a large bag of marijuana .... " Id.
(emphasis added). The seizure should have been ruled invalid given that the officer
"squeezed" the object. Nevertheless, the court overlooked that fact, and instead, choose to
focus on the officer's use of the word "immediate." The court stated, "[a]ccording to the
[o]fficer . . . . he immediately upon squeezing the bulge recognized that the bulge was
made by marijuana. Under these circumstances, [the] [o]fficer . . . was entitled to seize
the marijuana." Id. at *5.
This court should be criticized, not only for misapplying the law, but also for blind-
ly accepting the officer's testimony that he immediately recognized the bulge as marijuana
even though he testified that he actually squeezed the bulge. This case illustrates the
important role trial courts play. In order to ensure that the plain feel exception will not
further erode the Fourth Amendment, trial courts must be alert to the possibility that an
officer may taint his testimony in order to comply with Dickerson. See State v. McCulley,
No. 64470, 1994 WL 164013, *12 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (Blackmon, J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting that the officer's statements were "probably the result of post-arrest reflections on
how to rationalize an improper seizure").
147. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 242 n.39 ("Police perjury disturbingly [is] a well-docu-
mented aspect of criminal justice administration.") (quoting R. VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE
SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, AND PRACTICEs 108 (1985));
see also Charles v. Wade, Section 1983 Witness Immunity For Public Officials, 16 GA. L.
REv. 721, 740 (1982) ("Perjured testimony by police officers, offered to convict defen-
dants they think are guilty, is commonplace and familiar .... "). This propensity to
commit perjury has not gone unnoticed by the courts. See, e.g., Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145, 172 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (attacking the credibility of the
police); United States v. Marshall, 488 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1973) (commenting on
the willingness of narcotic agents to make false affidavits and distort facts).
148. See Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An
Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 75, 83 (1992)
(estimating that police commit perjury between 20% and 50% of the time they testify on
Fourth Amendment issues); see also Paul G. Chevigny, 4 CRIM. L. BuLL. 581, 581
(1968) (commenting that police lie in suppression hearings about how they obtained the
evidence); Joseph D. Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Counsel: Spinelli-Harris Search War-
rants and the Possibility of Police Perjury, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 405, 409 (reporting that
studies show that police will commit perjury to save a case).
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and replication by a trial court curtailing an officer's opportunity to
dishonestly claim that he immediately recognized the contraband as
drugs.'
49
In United States v. Williams,'50 two officers approached a
parked car in a high crime area known for its illicit drug trade.'
As the officers approached, the defendant shoved a paper bag
underneath his leg.' One of the officers asked the defendant to
exit the vehicle.' As the defendant exited, he "'attempted to
flip' the bag into the back of the car."'54 Unsuccessful, "[t]he bag
hit the driver's seat, and fell back into the front of the passenger
compartment."'55 The other officer then picked it up. When he
touched the bag, he could feel numerous rolled up objects.'56 He
opened the bag, uncovered contraband, and then arrested the defen-
dant. "  The court upheld the opening of the bag on the grounds
that the sense of touch was "a necessary corollary to the plain
view doctrine."'58 In so holding, the court noted that evidence
seized under the plain feel exception allows a court to evaluate the
situation in determining a motion to suppress. 59 The court decid-
ed that "tactile information ... generally can be preserved for tri-
al."" ° Thus, the Williams Court was given an opportunity to eval-
uate the paper bag and its contents in assessing the validity of the
seizure."
The ability to preserve evidence was again evident in United
States v. Pace. In Pace, the police stopped the defendant in an
airport after reasonably suspecting him of being a drug courier.'63
149. See infra text accompanying notes 130-49.
150. 822 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
151. Id. at 1176.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1177.
154. Id.
155. United State v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1183.
159. See id. (noting that in many circumstances, it may be an unnecessary formality to
require that a warrant be obtained).
160. United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174, 1177, 1184 n.105 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
161. See id. at 1185 (finding sufficient evidence in the record to satisfy the requirement
of the plain touch exception). Some jurisdictions have refused to accept the "plain smell"
doctrine on the grounds that the "fleeting and evanescent nature of odors renders it almost
impossible for a court considering a motion to suppress to evaluate them." Id. at 1184
n.105.
162. 709 F. Supp. 948 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
163. See id. at 950-51 (describing how officers approached defendant and then patted
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A search of defendant's bag revealed no contraband.'14 However,
the police then asked the defendant whether they could frisk his
outer clothing.'65 The defendant acquiesced.'6 During this pat-
down, the officer felt two hard objects on defendant's back and
concluded that the objects were cocaine bricks. 67 The court ap-
plied the plain feel doctrine in upholding the seizure of the bricks
and commented that "tactile information can be preserved for trial
to assure courts of an opportunity to evaluate the objects the offi-
cer claims to have triggered his sense of touch."'18 Thus, in Pace,
the trial judge was actually able to touch the cocaine bricks during
a recreation of the pat-down search and thus, was in a position to
better evaluate the officer's claim that he immediately recognized
the "bricks" as cocaine. 69 It will be this preservation of evidence
and the opportunity to recreate the scene which will counter an
officer's attempt to categorically state that he "immediately" identi-
fied the objects as contraband and which will prevent further ero-
sion of the Fourth Amendment.
D. The Pretextual Use of Terry
Another concern that the plain feel exception raises is that it
provides an incentive for officers to use Terry as a pretext to con-
duct broad evidentiary searches. 70
him down after he voluntarily stopped and consented to the search). The court went on to
say that the officer in this case did not even have to prove reasonable suspicion. Accord-
ing to the court, this encounter was consensual and did not implicate any Fourth
Amendment issues since defendant could have reasonably believed that he was free to
leave. See id. at 951-52 (relying on the public nature of the encounter and the decorum
of the officers involved).
164. Id. at 951.
165. Id.
166. United State v. Pace, 709 F. Supp. 948, 951 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 956.
169. Id.; cf. Commonwealth v. Marconi, 597 A.2d 616, 622-24 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)
(rejecting an officer's claim that he immediately recognized an object as methamphetamine
during a patdown as "mere speculation, conjecture and hindsight"). In Marconi, the court
rejected the officer's contention that he was able to determine that the two spongy objects
were contraband. Id. Although the court did not specifically mention the advantage of
having tactile evidence preserved for trial, and in fact, rejected the plain feel doctrine, its
analysis of the officer's testimony and its subsequent rejection of that testimony suggests
that an officer cannot merely state that he immediately recognized the nature of the con-
traband.
170. For the argument that approving of a plain feel exception would be to invite the
use of weapon searches as a pretext for unwarranted searches, see State v. Collins, 679
P.2d 80, 84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that safety concerns provide the only justifica-
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Terry permits a frisk of a suspect only when the officer, after
lawfully stopping a suspect, has a reasonable fear for his safety or
others nearby.' However, there is a general consensus that in
narcotics trafficking weapons are tools of the trade and that a
person stopped for suspected drug activity is likely to have
weapons nearby."7 Even though an officer actually may not have
any belief that a suspect is armed and dangerous, the "drugs equals
guns" theory enables the officer to assume that the person is
armed.'73 In essence, Terry becomes greatly expanded because the
officer who stops an individual suspected of drug activity essential-
ly is granted an immediate right to frisk the suspect for weapons.
Thus, the argument is that the object of the Terry frisk which was
to reveal weapons 74 becomes expanded by the plain feel doctrine
to include an evidentiary search for contraband. Although this
pretextual issue is a major concern, it is not the result of the plain
feel doctrine and was in place well before the advent of plain feel.
With or without the plain feel doctrine, there is simply nothing
preventing unscrupulous officers from using Terry as a pretext. As
Chief. Justice Rehnquist stated, "[the rule] is powerless to deter
invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police
either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo suc-
cessful prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal."'75
Thus, if an officer merely wants to harass a suspect, he will do
so. If he wants to scare the person, he will do so. This "unscrupu-
lous cop" doctrine merely suggests that the police occasionally can
and do break the rules of the game to achieve other goals. As a
result, the extent to which Terry will be used as a pretext is no
greater today with the acceptance of the plain feel doctrine than it
was when Terry was first decided. Indeed, it could be argued that
the pretextual use of Terry will have little or no success in the
context of the plain feel doctrine.
tion for warrantless searches); People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298, 302 (N.Y. 1993) (likening
the rationale behind plain touch searches to mere bootstrapping); State v. Broadnax, 654
P.2d 96, 102 (Wash. 1982) (quoting State v. Hobart, 617 P.2d 429 (Wash. 1980) (holding
that the net effect would be a severe erosion of Fourth Amendment protections)).
171. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968).
172. See supra note 99.
173. See State v. Guy, 492 N.W.2d 311, 320 (Wis. 1992) (Heffernan, J., dissenting)
("[The] logic of the majority invokes a presumption that all persons living in areas in-
filtrated by drug traffickers could be considered armed and dangerous.").
174. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
175. Id. at 13-14.
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Even if an officer uses the pretext approach, his ability to
actually seize an item will be limited because the sense of touch
rarely immediately identifies an object's criminality and because the
evidence seized pursuant to an officer's touch is more readily
subject to review by a court. 76 Thus, if an officer truly desires to
conduct a search for drugs and uses the pretextual approach, he
still must satisfy the rigid requirement that he determined the
object's criminality at the first touch of defendant's body. The
pretextual use of Terry will be limited because an officer must
satisfy the immediate recognition requirement or persuade a court,
which will have the benefit of a reenactment, that the officer's fear
was reasonable.
V. FACTORS THAT MAY INTERFERE WITH THE BALANCED
RULING N DICKERSON
The argument that the plain feel doctrine will not erode the
Fourth Amendment rests on the assumption that trial courts will
apply the plain feel doctrine according to the strict limits set out
by the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, legal doctrines are suscepti-
ble to poor interpretation." It is this "interpretation" that makes
the plain feel doctrine the most troublesome. Thus, in assessing
whether plain feel will further erode the Fourth Amendment, one
must consider the possibility that trial courts will misapply the law
and that judges may be openly hostile toward the Fourth Amend-
ment.
7 1
176. See supra text accompanying notes 147-49.
177. This is evident by the Supreme Court itself. In Katz v. United States, Justice
Harlan's two-prong test for determining whether a particular police action constituted a
search was 1) whether the individual had a subjective expectation of privacy and 2)
whether this interest was one that society recognized as reasonable. Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). This two-prong test has been subse-
quently turned on its head by the Supreme Court to actually limit Fourth Amendment
protections. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989) (holding that aerial
surveillance does not constitute a search); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37
(1988) (rummaging through a person's garbage does not constitute a search); Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (intruding upon open field which had been
fenced in and locked to prevent trespassers held not to constitute a search); United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282-85 (1983) (finding that use of a tracking device does not
constitute a search); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (obtaining telephone
numbers dialed does not constitute a search).
178. See supra note 146 (describing situation where a court completely ignored the self-
serving nature of the officer's testimony).
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A. Misapplication of Dickerson
If courts do not deviate from the limits as established by
Dickerson, the plain feel doctrine will not erode the Fourth
Amendment. The plain feel doctrine's effect on the Fourth Amend-
ment will depend greatly on courts following the requirements of
the plain feel doctrine as established by Dickerson and resisting
further manipulation of that standard.
179
For instance, in State v. Evans,' the dissent stated, "[s]ince
the officer's intrusion into Evan's pocket was not justified under
Terry as a pat-down search for weapons, it remains to determine
whether it was justified under the 'plain feel' exception recognized
by the United States Supreme Court in Dickerson.'' The dissent
has misinterpreted the law. If the officer cannot satisfy the require-
ments of Terry, there can be no further analysis. Once it is deter-
mined that the initial intrusion was unlawful, plain view does not
come into play and neither does plain feel. The plain feel doctrine
is not a separate exception, as this dissent suggests, but an exten-
sion of the plain view exception.'
B. Hostilities Toward the Fourth Amendment
The plain feel doctrine, like any other Fourth Amendment
principle is subject to the hostilities of the Court. The Supreme
Court has stated that "searches conducted outside the judicial pro-
cess ... are per se unreasonable,"''  and that exceptions to the
warrant requirement are to be "few"' 84 and "jealously and careful-
ly drawn. ,85 Yet, the fact of the matter is that most searches to-
day are conducted without a warrant. 186 Technically speaking, the
Supreme Court has relied on a general reasonableness standard to
balance the interest of the people in being free from unbridled
179. This concern is a real one. See, e.g., United States v. Salazar, 945 F.2d 47, 48 (2d
Cir. 1991) (illustrating an officer testifying that he had squeezed the outside of the
suspect's pocket). The court did not mention or seemingly overlooked the fact that the
officer squeezed the object and upheld the seizure of contraband. Id. at 51. Under
Dickerson, Salazar would be an incorrect holding.
180. 618 N.E.2d 162 (Ohio 1993).
181. Id. at 175 (Wright, J., dissenting).
182. See supra text accompanying note 94.
183. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
184. Id.
185. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
186. See generally supra note 19 (listing cases demonstrating exceptions to the Fourth.
Amendment).
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police force against the interest of the police in effectively carrying
out their duties.'87 Too often the Supreme Court has ruled in fa-
vor of giving the police greater leeway. 88 This desire to give the
police greater leeway was no clearer than in Dickerson itself.
During the course of the trial, Dickerson's counsel stated that
there was a possibility that an officer could stop any number of
persons in a bad neighborhood and subject them to a search for
drugs.'89 Chief Justice Rehnquist replied, "[w]hat's wrong with
that?"' This comment represents a clear indication of the hostili-
ty that is held toward the Fourth Amendment. Although
Rehnquist's comment is shocking, it is educational. It alerts the
practicing attorney and the Fourth Amendment advocate to the
Court's hostility toward the Fourth Amendment. Dickerson, howev-
er, will not be able to be used like Katz v. United States.9 as a
vehicle through which the Fourth Amendment is given less protec-
tion.
In Katz, the Court established that in order for a particular
police procedure to come under the strictures of the Fourth
Amendment, an individual must first prove to have manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy.'92 Second, this subjective ex-
pectation of privacy must be recognized by society as legitimate or
reasonable. 9 This definition of privacy established by Katz was
the perfect vehicle through which a conservative wing of the court
could attack the Fourth Amendment.'94 Since "justifiable" and
"reasonably" are highly manipulatable, the Court, seeking to give
greater leeway to the police, "has not found it difficult to explain
why for one reason or another the defendant could not 'reason-
ably,' 'justifiably,' or 'legitimately' have expected that his activities
would remain undisclosed. Thus ... Katz has supplied ... a
handy verbal formula for exempting a variety of intrusive law
187. See supra text accompanying notes 33-40.
188. This is evident in the numerous police activities which do not even constitute a
Fourth Amendment search, see supra note 26, and the numerous exceptions to the warrant
requirement. See supra note 19.
189. James J. Kilpatrick, Supreme Court Tests Search and Seizure: Halt! Up Against the
Wall, Fella! Let's Feel What's Inside Your Pocketd, MIAMI HERALD, May 14, 1993, at
25a.
190. Id. (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist).
191. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
192. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
193. Id.
194. Wasserstrom, supra note 3, at 270-71.
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enforcement practices . ... 195
Plain feel, on the other hand, is strictly tied to the plain view
requirements.'" The scope of plain feel cannot be any broader
than what is specifically allowed by the underlying intrusion. In
Dickerson, the scope of plain view was tied to the purposes estab-
lished in Terry.'"' Since Terry allows only for a pat-down search
of weapons, plain feel cannot be used to justify a pat-down search
for contraband.' 98
VI. CONCLUSION
A determination of the validity of a particular police procedure,
like plain feel, is arrived at by balancing the intrusion on Fourth
Amendment privacy interests against the value in promoting effec-
tive and legitimate law enforcement interests.'" The Dickerson
decision struck a balance between these competing interests. The
police interest in effective law enforcement was forwarded by
recognizing their ability to use their sense of touch, but the privacy
interests of individuals were also protected by limiting plain feel to
only those situations where an officer can immediately recognize
the object as contraband.
Judges must recognize the balance that needs to be maintained.
Individuals must be free from unabridged police force while the
police need some leeway in carrying out their duties. The Supreme
Court in Dickerson carefully struck this balance. However, Chief
195. Id.
196. See supra text accompanying note 94.
197. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1993) (limiting protective
searches to that which is necessary to locate weapons).
198. Id The early results are in, and it appears that most courts recognize the limited
holding of Dickerson. See, e.g., People v. Dickey, 21 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 952, 957 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1994) (holding the retrieval of an object invalid where the officer
"squeezed" the object); Harris v. Florida, 641 So. 2d 126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (de-
termining the seizure of plastic baggies during a frisk was valid given that the officer did
not squeeze or otherwise manipulate the object); State v. Scott, 518 N.W.2d 347, 349-50
(Iowa 1994) (finding the seizure of contraband from defendant's pocket valid; officer did
not further manipulate the object after failing to immediately recognize it as contraband
but instead asked the defendant what the object was); People v. Champion, 518 N.W.2d
518, 522 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (conducting visual inspection of pill bottle violated plain
feel exception where the incriminating nature was not immediately apparent); State v.
Cloud, 91 Ohio App. 3d 366, 370 (1994) (holding Dickerson analysis not applicable be-
cause officer did not know what the object was); State v. Kersh, 523 N.W.2d 210 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1994) (upholding the seizure of contraband pursuant to the plain feel doctrine
where the officer touched objects for a "second" and immediately recognized it as crack).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
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Justice Rehnquist's comment has opened the door to, and in fact
invited, a situation where innocent individuals living in depressed
areas may be subject to baseless intrusions by the police. In order
for the plain feel doctrine not to become an object that destroys
the Fourth Amendment, the trial courts must appreciate the impor-
tant role they will play in subsequently applying Dickerson. Not
only must these courts pay heed to the limited ruling of Dickerson,
they must pay particular attention to the evidence to determine
whether it supports an officer's testimony that he immediately
recognized an object as contraband. This immediate recognition
requirement should not merely be paid lip service like the principle
announced in Katz that warrantless searches are per se unreason-
able.
Success in preventing the plain feel doctrine from eroding the
Fourth Amendment will depend on a variety of factors. Courts
must apply the strict limits of plain feel, must curtail the use of
pretexts, and must be alert for police perjury. The fact that the
Supreme Court has spoken on this issue, plus the ability of a court
to reenact a frisk and seizure of contraband, will help prevent this
erosion.
In sum, the Fourth Amendment was not attacked in Dickerson.
Instead, a balance was struck between the right of individuals to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures and 'the needs of the
police in effectively discharging their law enforcement duties. In-
deed, the Supreme Court has limited plain feel to such an extent
that it has, in effect, created an illusion: the plain feel exception is
not an exception at all. Instead, plain feel is merely a recognition
that the sense of touch may be reliable in the course of police
conduct.
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